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Undermining “The Deal of the Century”:  
The Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline & the Failure of American 
Economic Pressure on the Soviet Energy Industry 
 
 
Brandon von Kannewurff 
 
 
In late 1981, President Ronald Reagan blindsided his 
Western European allies and imposed far-reaching unilateral 
sanctions on the USSR. Ostensibly issued in response to the 
declaration of martial law in Poland, these sanctions suspended 
existing American contracts with the USSR to construct a 3,000-
mile natural gas pipeline from Siberia to Western Europe.1 Six 
months later, the United States doubled down despite fierce 
European opposition. On June 18, 1982, Reagan again sided with 
his hardline advisors and ruled that subsidiaries and licensees of 
U.S. companies that produced equipment abroad would violate U.S. 
law if they supplied the Soviet Union these parts. However, the 
United States’ determination to exert economic pressure fizzled out 
by the end of the year. Though the U.S. backed down on sanctions 
in November 1982, it still claimed victory and argued that the new 
agreement with Western Europe would prove even more effective at 
countering the influence of the Soviet Union.  
Even today, these sanctions remain the centerpiece of the 
Reagan Victory School narrative that the U.S. systematically 
exploited Soviet economic weakness to triumph in the Cold War. 
This view, popularized by historian Francis Marlo and journalist 
Peter Schweizer, identifies U.S. pressure on the Soviet oil and gas 
industry as a critical piece of the equation. In his book Victory, 
Schweizer claims that the American ability to undermine the 
Siberian pipeline and its pressure on Saudi Arabia to flood the oil 
markets was part of “a secret offensive on economic, geostrategic, 
and psychological fronts designed to roll back and weaken Soviet 
power.”2 Marlo’s account makes a similar, if more measured, point. 
In his book Planning Reagan’s War, he argues that the Reagan 
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administration knew “the Soviet economy was stagnating, with 
economic growth and labor productivity steeply declining while raw 
material costs were skyrocketing,” and capitalized on this weakness 
to undermine the influence of the Soviet state.3 These ‘Reagan 
Victory School’ views theorize that American pressure impelled 
Gorbachev to pursue reform and end the Cold War on Western 
terms. 
Recent scholarship from revisionist historians David Painter 
and Tyler Esno rejects these claims. In his essay “Oil and the End of 
the Cold War,” Painter explores the macro-level effects of Reagan’s 
Cold War policy. He ultimately concludes that “there is little 
evidence” Gorbachev embarked on economic reform as a result of 
U.S. policies.4 Esno, on the other hand, dives deeper into Reagan’s 
personal conception of economic pressure through the Siberian 
pipeline. He argues that Reagan “stumbled into an economic war 
against the Soviet Union” and abandoned economic pressure once it 
proved ineffective.5 
After weighing newly released FRUS documents against 
memoirs and the current historiography, this paper finds that the 
‘Reagan Victory School’ narrative has not stood the test of time. 
Throughout his presidency, Reagan’s goal remained the same: to 
elevate America’s bargaining position and, once that was 
accomplished, negotiate with the Soviet Union on American terms. 
Ineffective sanctions on the Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline, however, 
caused Reagan to shift tactics once unilateral American pressure 
proved counterproductive to his negotiating goals. This idea was 
echoed by Soviet leaders during this period. Not only were General 
Secretaries Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko not swayed by 
American pressure early in the decade, their successor, Mikhail 
Gorbachev, already believed in the need to reform economically 
when he took power in 1985. Although Reagan centered his 
economic pressure on the Soviet energy industry, his counterpart 
focused more broadly on larger inefficiencies in industrial and 
agricultural production, military spending, and the moral standing 
of the Soviet economy. Thus, while oil and gas did play a role in 
inducing Gorbachev to reform, its impact was relatively minor, 
especially when compared to the weight given by ‘Victory School’ 
advocates. 
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American Intelligence & Perceptions of Soviet Energy 
Weakness 
 
By the end of the 1970s, the CIA famously predicted a stark 
future for the Soviet energy economy. In a widely circulated 1977 
study, the agency claimed that Soviet petroleum output would peak 
by 1980 and that the energy giant would become a net oil importer 
just five years later.6 The CIA understood that General Secretary 
Brezhnev’s government prioritized investment speed over quality—
a choice that led to inefficient use of resources and placed major 
strains on long run production viability. Under pressure to boost 
petroleum production, Soviet state oil companies injected water in 
new wells to rapidly ramp up extraction, a practice that illustrated 
the USSR’s production woes. While most producers around the 
globe utilized this tactic to some degree, Soviet producers took it to 
the extreme. By the early 1980s, “the volume of water injected 
exceeded not only the volume of oil produced, but it even surpassed 
the amount of fluids produced.”7 These aggressive tactics 
dramatically shortened the life of even the richest oilfields and 
caused productivity to plummet. Despite Brezhnev’s heavy focus on 
investment and employment, overall petroleum output fell by 21 
percent from 1975-1985.8 The 1977 CIA report proved that the 
agency was keenly aware of these industry headwinds. The paper 
predicted the share of new oil output required to offset inefficient 
production from older fields would rise to an astounding 80 percent 
by 1980.9 Though this claim underestimated the sector’s resilience, 
the report overall accurately portrayed the weaknesses facing the 
Soviet energy industry during this period.10 
Three interrelated macroeconomic developments within the 
oil industry during the 1970s also made the Soviet economy heavily 
vulnerable to developments in global energy trade. Firstly, price 
spikes during the decade incentivized the Kremlin to further open 
up what had once been a contained economy. In eight years between 
1972 and 1980, Soviet oil exports rose by 50 percent, while soaring 
prices boosted Soviet revenue by a staggering factor of 18.11 This 
boom fundamentally changed the composition of the Soviet 
economy. The previously closed market “in fact bec[a]me deeply 
integrated into the system of international trade and dependent on 
world markets.”12 The CIA particularly understood that this 
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increased openness could provide an opportunity for the West to dial 
up the pressure on its adversary. In a 1981 report, the CIA observed 
that “[i]f the USSR were denied access to Western equipment and 
technology, the Soviets would be forced to go it alone, entailing 
major losses in product quality and labor productivity.”13 Thus, 
while rising oil prices offered the USSR the opportunity to earn hard 
currency revenues, the CIA believed this exposure also rendered the 
economy vulnerable to the threat of trade pressure from Western 
allies. 
 Perhaps more important than the gross oil revenues 
themselves was how the Kremlin used these oil revenues. In the 
early 1970s, a series of poor harvests and inefficiencies in industrial 
production led Brezhnev’s government to import a large quantity of 
foodstuffs, machinery, ore, and metals.14 At the same time, the 
government began to use oil as a “‘swing fuel’ in adjusting the hard 
currency trade balance” in order to avoid trade deficits.15 In this case 
also, the CIA knew the USSR was using oil revenues as a crutch to 
balance trade deficits. In the same 1981 report, the agency observed 
that rising energy and gold prices allowed the Soviets to fund its 
$12.5 billion in food imports in 1981.16 While using oil as a swing 
fuel made sense in theory, U.S. intelligence officials understood that 
changes in global energy trade would not just affect the Kremlin. 
Instead, the use of oil revenues as a swing fuel rendered the basic 
needs of the bloc’s population vulnerable to macroeconomic 
developments. 
Finally, the Kremlin could still have justified this strategy if 
it had proactively insulated the economy to energy price volatility. 
As historian Philip Hanson shows, relying on oil revenues was 
“eminently sustainable so long as oil prices did not collapse.”17 To 
protect themselves from macroeconomic shifts, resource-driven 
economies such as the USSR typically “create hard currency 
reserves or invest the income in liquid financial instruments,” such 
as the massive Sovereign Wealth Funds common in oil-driven 
economies like the UAE and Norway.18 Brezhnev took none of these 
precautions. Instead, his administration viewed energy exports as an 
apparently permanent revenue source, an assumption that 
endangered the greater economy. .19 The CIA, however, recognized 
the danger of a do-nothing policy. Since the USSR did not take the 
proper precautionary measures, the agency claimed “the hard 
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currency prospects [were not] bright in the immediate years ahead” 
in a market facing stagnant or declining oil prices.20 Despite historic 
revenues during the 1970s, failure to reform created a highly risky 
situation in the USSR. 
Finally, although the CIA understood the acute problems 
facing the Soviet oil industry, the agency did not believe unilateral 
U.S. sanctions would drastically affect Soviet behavior. The CIA 
considered the Brezhnev leadership resistant to change. Soviet 
leadership believed that “their economic problems, while serious, 
are not cause for panic, and should begin to ease during the 1990s.”21 
Additionally, despite the hardline beliefs of its director, the agency 
itself did not believe economic pressure would induce change 
without sustained help from U.S. allies. Instead, its report on 
potential sanctions for the Soviet Natural Gas Pipeline found that 
“[i]n none of these cases would unilateral US actions have much 
effect. Any decision to impose additional restrictions would have to 
consider their impact on the West as well as on the USSR.”22 These 
qualifications, however, mattered less to hardliners in the Reagan 
administration than the report’s tone, which stressed that the USSR 
was clearly vulnerable to Western influence. 
 
The Reagan Administration & the Siberian Natural Gas 
Pipeline 
 
Eager to test the resolve of the Soviet energy industry, 
Reagan believed that the U.S. could place significant pressure on the 
empire’s economic capacity by opposing construction of the 
Siberian Natural Gas Pipeline. Heralded as “the deal of the century” 
upon its official announcement in 1980, the resource-rich Soviet 
Union designed the pipeline to export its bountiful natural gas to 
energy-hungry Western Europe.23 For the Soviet Union, the pipeline 
would serve as a critical source of hard currency revenues, with the 
potential to draw in five billion dollars in revenues annually to the 
cash-strapped state. For Western Europe, the project would diversify 
energy imports away from the Middle East and could potentially tie 
Soviet interests tighter to those of Western European allies.24 While 
the Carter administration raised concerns about relying on the 
West’s ideological enemy for energy, the U.S. eventually bowed to 
its allies and reluctantly allowed the deal to go through.25 The 
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incoming Reagan administration, however, sought to challenge 
these notions retroactively. Afraid the trade deal would give the 
Soviet Union unwanted leverage over its Western allies, Reagan 
administration officials first raised concerns over the pipeline at an 
Ottawa economic summit in July 1981.26 Though these ideas were 
met with a tepid response, an opportunity to dispel American 
malaise arose five months later when Poland declared martial law to 
counteract rising political opposition. 
Opinions on how to respond to Soviet repression were 
mixed. The hardliners, consisting of CIA director Bill Casey, 
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger, and the President’s 
Assistant for National Security Affairs, William Clark, strongly 
believed that the Kremlin depended on trade with the West to 
improve the bloc’s standard of living. Since “the key to the drive for 
military power has been the ability of the Soviet economy to provide 
small but steady improvements to the standard of living,” this group 
believed that all trade to the USSR essentially constituted economic 
aid.27 Cognizant of the CIA’s reports on Soviet energy weakness, 
yet not mindful of its warnings, hardliners sought to ramp up 
pressure on the U.S.’ adversary.28  Writing in the wake of the first 
round of sanctions, Weinberger reflected: “the events in Poland have 
created our best opportunity for derailing the West Siberia to 
Western Europe national gas pipeline project...”29 CIA director 
Casey also held more hawkish views than the agency he directed. If 
the U.S. imposed extraterritoriality by preventing pipeline sales of 
all foreign subsidiaries and licensees, it could “delay completion of 
the pipeline by something close to 3 years.”30 These hardliners held 
lofty views of American economic coercive power and eagerly 
argued that flexing these muscles would elevate the geopolitical 
power of the United States. 
While both the hardliners and the moderates believed that 
the Siberian pipeline was antithetical to the goals of the Reagan 
administration, they strongly differed on whether to oppose the 
pipeline itself. In the initial sanctions discussion, moderate officials, 
such as Secretary of State Haig and Secretary of Commerce 
Malcolm Baldridge, brought a more nuanced position to the table. 
Though agreeing in principle on the need to exert economic pressure 
on the USSR, Baldridge noted that: “[w]e want to be as tough as we 
can, operating in the real world. If we go too far and can’t get our 
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Allies to go with us, it won’t work… We cannot stop all these 
countries from shipping to the USSR.”31  Secretary Haig offered 
similar advice. While he acknowledged that the pipeline “runs 
contrary to our security interests,” he also asserted that “by pursuing 
our maximum objectives, we run the risk of coming away with very 
little, severely weakening the Alliance and isolating us from our 
Allies.”32 These moderate officials held similar views as the CIA 
reports: that unilateral U.S. economic sanctions would fracture the 
East-West alliance while failing to place pressure on the Soviet 
economy. 
While aware of the potential downsides of sanctions, 
Reagan’s ideological alignment with the hardliners swayed him to 
pursue a policy of coercion. In this moment, Reagan’s ideological 
fervor to strengthen the geopolitical position of the capitalist West 
reigned supreme over his belief in free trade. Reagan “always 
believed that, as an economic system, Communism was doomed,” 
and during his first NSC briefings, he learned that the USSR “was 
approaching the brink of collapse.”33 His comments during early 
NSC meetings highlighted this ideological fervor. Speaking in favor 
of more intensive sanctions on key equipment for Siberian oil 
construction, Reagan justified his position by claiming the moral 
high ground: “I for one don’t think we are being harsh or rigid. The 
Soviets have spoken as plainly as Hitler did in ‘Mein Kampf.’ They 
have spoken world domination—at what point do we dig in our 
heels?”34 This was not the only time the president likened his 
adversary to Nazi Germany. A year later, also in an NSC meeting 
discussing sanctions, the president continued to support hardline 
measures, claiming that: “President Roosevelt called for a 
quarantine on Germany in 1939. He had his brains kicked out. What 
would history have been like if he had been listened to?”35 
Influenced heavily by his closely held ideological views, Reagan 
sided with the hardliners and imposed unilateral U.S. sanctions on 
the Soviet Union on December 30th, 1981. 
 
 Western European Opposition & Reagan’s Reversal 
 
Western European reaction was swift and uniformly harsh. 
West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt resolutely proclaimed 
“the pipeline will be built,” while the French foreign minister 
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reacted with outrage and bombastically declared the beginning of a 
“‘progressive divorce’ within the alliance because ‘we no longer 
speak the same language.’”36 Across the entire political spectrum in 
Western Europe, officials denounced U.S. actions. They vowed to 
continue the pipeline project without U.S. support, signaling a stark 
decline of American geopolitical influence. 
While Reagan did attempt to mitigate the impact of his 
decision on the U.S.’ allies, he initially did not allow the concerns 
of Western Europe to overrule his own convictions. Writing to the 
president’s assistant for national security affairs, William Clark, 
NSC Staff member Richard Pipes said he believed backing down 
“will destroy once and for all any credibility of the policy of 
economic sanctions,” which “would be particularly regrettable now 
that the Soviet Union faces an unprecedented economic crisis and is 
more than ever vulnerable to various economic pressures.”37 Reagan 
and the hardliners believed backing down would abdicate all control 
over its economic lever, forcing the U.S. to rely on military threats 
to improve its negotiating position over its ideological archenemy.38 
With these concerns in mind, Reagan issued NSDD-41 on June 22, 
1982. Rather than scaling back sanctions and risk losing credibility, 
he invoked extraterritoriality to prevent not only U.S. companies 
from selling Western technology to the Soviets, but also their 
subsidiaries and licensees.39 Despite staunch European resistance, 
Reagan clung to his ideological view of American exceptionalism 
and ramped up economic pressure on the USSR. 
This hardline ideological position began to soften when 
George Shultz replaced Haig as secretary of state and tactfully 
showed the president his tactical error. On one hand, like Haig, 
Shultz realized that European opposition hindered the effectiveness 
of U.S. sanctions. In an NSC meeting two months after his 
appointment, he judiciously noted “almost any trade measure in 
East-West trade is more effective if implemented by all the Western 
countries.”40 Instead of inhibiting a common enemy, these sanctions 
created a “new and formidable barrier” to other objectives of the 
U.S.-European alliance.41  In the months to follow, Shultz reasoned 
that ineffective sanctions damaged other aspects of Reagan’s “Peace 
Through Strength” agenda, particularly plans to deploy 
intermediate-range ballistic missiles in Europe.  To Shultz, the 
Western Alliance must erase all fractures “before the critical year 
8
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1983, with its controversial missile deployments, arrived.”42 The 
new secretary of state showed the president that sanctions failed to 
assert U.S. strength adequately and that new tactics were needed in 
order to improve America’s geopolitical position.  
On November 13, 1982, President Reagan decided to lift oil 
and gas sanctions against the Soviet Union, representing a critical 
tactical shift in his foreign policy. In return for backing down on 
sanctions, European allies agreed to a series of vague measures, 
including non-binding studies of Western European energy 
dependency, harmonization of credit policies, and an agreement not 
to “contribute to the military or strategic advantage of the USSR.”43 
Though Shultz claimed internally that the policies “represented a 
victory for the Alliance, not for any individual country,” these 
resolutions were largely a face-saving measure designed to mend the 
alliance.44 The sanctions had only served to delay the pipeline’s 
implementation by a few months and had scarcely influenced the 
situation in Poland, which was ostensibly the official goal of the 
sanctions.45 Rather, Reagan aspired to mitigate the perception of a 
fractured Western alliance, claiming that “the understanding we’ve 
reached demonstrates that the Western alliance is fundamentally 
united…” and that the alliance would coordinate trade measures 
moving forward.46 Thus, the Siberian pipeline episode demonstrated 
the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic pressure and forced 
Reagan to reconsider hardliner tactics. 
 ‘Reagan Victory School’ advocates point to National 
Security Directives 66 & 75 to argue that the administration 
continued economic pressure even after Reagan repealed sanctions. 
Marlo claims that NSDD-66 specifically limited controls on Soviet 
energy, as the Reagan administration sought to derail the industry 
which accounted for between 60 and 80 percent of the bloc’s hard 
currency earnings.47 Schweizer goes further, arguing that the 
administration crafted NSDD-75 “to exacerbate the Soviet 
economic problems in the hope of plunging the system into a 
crisis.”48 These claims are not validated by the text of the documents 
or the administration’s actions. Although NSDD-75 did seek to 
“ensure that East-West economic relations do not facilitate the 
Soviet military buildup,” one of three central goals of the document 
was to “engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt to reach 
agreements which protect and enhance U.S. interests…”49 Even 
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hardline advisor Richard Pipes noted that “Reagan specifically 
emphasized the importance of compromise with Soviet Leadership” 
while signing the order.50 Thus, while these documents contain 
elements of hardline policy, they also reflected the Reagan 
administration’s central goal to engage its ideological adversary in 
negotiation to de-escalate superpower tensions. 
In line with this aim, Reagan consistently decided not to 
ramp up economic pressure on the Soviet oil and gas industry after 
the Siberian pipeline fiasco. Instead, advice from Shultz and the 
moderates slowly resulted in a more measured U.S. policy geared 
toward negotiation. On March 16, 1983, Shultz laid out a vision for 
future U.S.-Soviet relations focused on exploring bilateral interests 
and the intent to “continue serious negotiations” of arms control 
with the Soviets.51 Despite, or perhaps because of, the fact Reagan 
had labeled the USSR as an “Evil Empire” eight days prior, Shultz 
stressed the need to “emphasize that we need to continue the 
dialogue” with the USSR, and “negotiate in good faith in the 
START and INF talks.”52 These views reflected Shultz’s growing 
belief that the U.S. had built up strength during Reagan’s first term 
and it was now time to pursue peace. The president began to 
welcome this idea as well. Writing in his diary on April 6, 1983, 
Reagan criticized the hardliners for not being open to negotiations, 
saying: “I do want to try and let [the Soviets] see there is a better 
world if they’ll show by deed they want to get along with the free 
world.”53 In this light, the president viewed that “a summit meeting 
could be a good thing,” as Shultz testified to the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee in June.54 Yet Shultz noted that, for such a 
meeting to be productive, the U.S. must find a willing negotiator on 
the other side. At this point, Reagan hesitated to take the first step, 
still unsure about his adversary’s intentions. However, with Shultz’s 
plan for long-term negotiation firmly in mind, Reagan began to ease 
his rhetoric against the USSR and mend a fraught relationship. 
This goal soon manifested itself in U.S. policy. By mid-
1983, the U.S. and the USSR signed a long-term grain agreement 
and moved forward on a wide-range of discussions designed to 
create a new cultural-exchanges agreement, upgrade the U.S.-USSR 
hotline, and prevent nuclear proliferation.55 The real test, however, 
came when moderates convinced Reagan to refrain from additional 
hardline action. After the USSR shot down Korean Airlines flight 
10
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007 on September 1, 1983, Reagan resisted pressure from hardliners 
to increase sanctions, showing that he had learned from the short-
sightedness of his Polish policy two years ago. Rather, he took 
Shultz’s view that the U.S. should “keep in mind what our long-term 
objective with the Soviet Union is.”56 Instead of ramping up 
pressure, Reagan recognized that “our arms control talks were near 
the threshold of an important new phase… I didn’t want to smother 
the nuclear arms reduction process before it had a chance to get 
started.”57 In this light, the Reagan administration resisted enacting 
new sanctions and slowly repealed existing sanctions, as evidenced 
by its lifting of the submersible drilling pump embargo in early 
1984.58 Reagan had no desire to repeat the fiasco of the Siberian 
pipeline crisis. Instead, the administration realized the success of 
economic pressure required a cohesive Western response.59 
As Reagan abandoned his harsh rhetoric and policies, he also 
began to reshuffle his advisors toward a more pragmatic group. 
Reagan personally despised dealing with bureaucratic squabbles, 
but nevertheless took on a larger mediator role as internal disputes 
metastasized over his first term. At the end of this period, Reagan 
again sided with Shultz versus the hardliners, commenting that: 
“Actually, George is carrying out my policy. I’m going to meet with 
Cap and Bill and lay it out to them. Won’t be fun but has to be 
done.”60 This moment was part of a larger trend of declining 
hardliner influence since the end of the Pipeline crisis. Soon after 
Reagan backed down on sanctions in late 1982, hardliners Thomas 
Reed, Richard Pipes and Bill Clark departed the NSC in 1983, while 
UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick left after Reagan’s first term.61 
Casey and Weinberger stayed on, but their influence diminished. 
Shultz noted Weinberger’s unwillingness to yield in negotiations 
initially found success, yet “its effectiveness waned, and Cap’s 
capacity to be part of final solutions declined.”62 The waning 
influence of hardliners symbolized Reagan’s shift toward a more 
pragmatic mindset as the administration increasingly engaged the 
Soviets in disarmament negotiations. 
A minority of ‘Victory School’ advocates also cite two 
incidents with dubious validity as evidence for continued economic 
warfare. Thomas Reed, an assistant for national security affairs to 
Reagan, claimed that the U.S. sold faulty software to the Soviets, 
resulting in a powerful explosion that delayed the pipeline’s 
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implementation. However, as has been already shown, the Siberian 
Natural Gas Pipeline came online with no significant delays to its 
timeline.63 Additionally, historians have noted inconsistencies 
regarding both the timing and location of his claims and the fact that 
there “is no independent evidence corroborating Reed’s account.”64 
Peter Schweizer popularized the second narrative, claiming that CIA 
director Bill Casey successfully lobbied Saudi Arabian King Fahd 
to increase oil output dramatically. As a result, oil price declines 
limited Soviet hard currency revenues and forced the new General 
Secretary, Mikhail Gorbachev, to institute reform.65 This evidence 
is limited as well. Though most of the State Department literature 
from the era is still classified, historian David Painter notes that the 
vast majority of former administration officials do not mention 
Saudi Arabian lobbying as an administrative goal. Furthermore, 
economic conditions at the time gave the Saudis “very good 
reasons—apart from US lobbying—to take the steps they did.”66 
Thus, contrary to the views of the ‘Victory School’, Reagan moved 
consistently away from his hardline ideological views and toward 
pragmatic engagement once the Siberian pipeline episode 
highlighted the ineffectiveness of unilateral economic pressure.   
 
Gorbachev: Origins of Reform 
 
Though American economic pressure had a minimal effect 
on the Soviet oil economy, the Soviets’ energy sector still faced 
objective economic problems. Whether these factors played a role 
in ending the Cold War, however, depended on the extent to which 
oil factored into Gorbachev’s belief that the Soviet economy 
demanded reform. Oil price declines did weigh heavily on the Soviet 
leader’s mind, yet his closest advisors were already convinced the 
sector needed reform as a result of widespread production issues 
over the past decade. Moreover, these reformers felt these 
production issues illustrated broader inefficiencies facing the entire 
economy. Gorbachev and his key advisors believed the flagging 
Soviet economy had failed to deliver the promise of socialism and 
desperately needed internal reform. 
The general secretary and reform-minded advisors had long 
understood the need to reform after decades of direct exposure to 
Soviet economic stagnation. Gorbachev’s reformist ideology 
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developed when he was a young leader and especially flourished 
especially when he became the First Secretary for the Stavropol 
region in 1970. Gorbachev gradually realized that over-
centralization of authority in the state “sapped the vital energies of 
society” and created a system in which “all initiative is 
punishable.”67 In an effort to improve these inefficiencies, the First 
Secretary experimented with collectivized agriculture in radical 
ways. Faced with unproductive crop yields, Gorbachev granted 
more autonomy to individual workers and family groups, allowed 
some regions to lay fallow, and encouraged technological 
innovation.68 These dramatic changes proved successful, and 
Gorbachev passed on this knowledge to his superiors as he climbed 
the party ladder. In a speech he designed for General Secretary 
Andropov, Gorbachev wrote that “[i]n our opinion it is necessary to 
give more independence to enterprises and associations in deciding 
various production and financial questions.”69 Thus, his early 
lessons in agriculture proved enduring, as Gorbachev later 
extrapolated these problems to the larger Soviet economy. 
Unlike most of his fellow countrymen, Gorbachev’s position 
as a high-ranking party official afforded him the opportunity to leave 
the country and gain firsthand knowledge of other nations’ social 
and economic systems. After a series of trips to Italy, France, 
Belgium, and West Germany during the 1970s, Gorbachev reckoned 
with the difference between the modern Western economies and 
their portrayal in Soviet propaganda.70 After returning to the USSR, 
Gorbachev said the most significant conclusion he drew from his 
time abroad was that “people there lived in better conditions and 
were better off than in our country. The question haunted me: why 
was the standard of living in our country lower than in other 
developed countries?”71 This did not mean Gorbachev had become 
a bourgeois capitalist; rather, he came to grasp the deficiencies in 
certain aspects of the Soviet system. This willingness to challenge 
accepted norms would manifest itself in policy when he became 
leader. 
As he ascended in the party, Gorbachev accessed new 
information that confirmed his belief that the nation’s economy 
needed reform. As a close advisor to Andropov, he and another 
colleague, Nikolai Ryzhkov, led a comprehensive analysis of Soviet 
economic stagnation in the early 1980s. According to Politburo 
13
von Kannewurff: Undermining 'The Deal of the Century'
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
 75 
member Vadim Medvedev, this analysis was critical to understand 
the USSR’s later reforms. Medvedev noted that for “the economists 
who worked with Gorbachev on the analysis of the situation and the 
development of a new economic policy, it was sufficiently clear the 
official statistics distorted many indicators of the growth and 
structure of the economy,” a view that undoubtedly resonated with 
a man who had seen this stagnation firsthand.72 Although he did not 
gain direct access to the budget, Gorbachev’s status as an upper-
level party official afforded him a unique perspective on the nation’s 
economic status. He knew that “our budget was full of holes… 
money was being drawn from the savings of the citizens and by 
raising the internal debt.” 73 As he gained more experience, 
Gorbachev realized that the broader Soviet economy desperately 
needed reform. 
 Gorbachev, however, was by no means the only major party 
official who held these bold views. The fact that key decision 
makers within the Politburo shared these principles allowed the 
USSR to enact the fateful series of economic and political reforms 
that led to the state’s downfall. Politburo member Alexander 
Yakovlev was particularly important in developing Gorbachev’s 
conception of reform. In a scathing indictment of the Soviet 
economic system that he wrote during his tenure in the Politburo, 
Yakovlev decried a system in which “[p]eople’s labor and genius, 
natural wealth and the material resources of society were spent 
recklessly—without any thought to purpose, volume, or 
efficiency.”74 Reformist Politburo member Anatoly Chernyaev 
shared these views. In a Politburo meeting in early 1985, Gorbachev 
recounted a series of striking economic inefficiencies that 
particularly resonated with Chernyaev’s view that drastic reforms 
were necessary to save a country “on the verge of collapse.75 With 
productivity in the food industry “two and a half to three times lower 
than in capitalist countries,” “[losses of] 30 percent of our 
agricultural produce…,” and “300 cities” without proper plumbing 
and sewage facilities, he believed the Soviet economy had failed to 
live up to its socialist expectations.76 Like Gorbachev, these 
members seriously questioned the longevity of a Soviet system that 
showed signs of stagnation across most sectors, including energy. 
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Economic Reform of General Secretary Gorbachev 
 
Gorbachev and his advisors understood the importance of 
the oil and gas industry to the success of the broader Soviet 
economy. Almost immediately after he took power in March 1985, 
the new general secretary passed two reform measures seeking to 
bolster the ailing sector. The first resolution recognized the wasteful 
energy production of the past decade, as it called for “enhancing the 
technical sophistication of production equipment... introducing 
energy saving technologies, speeding the processes of drilling wells 
and putting them into production.”77 The second resolution provided 
capital, as it called for a marked 60 percent increase in energy 
investment for Western Siberia.78 Critically, both of these initiatives 
focused less on the macro-landscape of world oil prices than on 
addressing the engineering and technological issues facing domestic 
energy production. Furthermore, Gorbachev enacted both of these 
initiatives in mid-1985, well before the November 1985 price shock 
placed major pressure on the Soviet economy.79 Overall, these two 
resolutions serve as a key indicator that Gorbachev hoped to tackle 
energy production problems from the earliest days of his 
administration. 
Gorbachev also visited Western Siberia in September 1985, 
marking the first visit to the region by a general secretary in nearly 
seven years.80 Although the early timing of the visit underscored the 
industry’s preeminence, Gorbachev’s speech there and memoirs 
afterwards contextualized the region’s problems within the broader 
issues facing the Soviet economy. While travelling through a city 
within Western Siberia, Tiumen’, Gorbachev took note of a series 
of structural issues that plagued the region’s productivity. Workers 
complained “there was no concern for efficient use of natural 
resources” and bemoaned the fact that the Western Siberia’s oil-
refining rate lagged 22 percentage points behind the world 
average.81 The general secretary also observed that the economy 
failed to deliver basic goods and services to the region. Workers 
lamented: “[t]here is a shortage of everything… The Soviet Union 
and Europe need gas, but it turns out no one needs us.”82 In an 
address to these workers, Gorbachev promised to help solve the 
region’s basic issues. The general secretary proclaimed “Tiumen’ 
oil and gas would be developed on a healthier, more rational basis, 
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including better housing and amenities, infrastructure, and industrial 
support.”83 Even in the heart of oil country, the general secretary 
focused his attention less on the specific issues of the oil industry 
than on the broader problems burdening the entire Soviet economy. 
Additionally, Gorbachev conceived of his ill-fated anti-
alcohol campaign at least partially because of the economy’s 
inefficiencies. Gorbachev saw the Soviet system mired in a crisis of 
character. One symptom of this crisis was a plague of alcoholism 
that marred both the morality and productivity of the whole socialist 
system. The general secretary believed the state must rectify this 
social ill, writing: “[t]oday our main job is to lift the individual 
spiritually, respecting his inner world and giving moral strength.”84 
Despite the moral basis of these reforms, Gorbachev and his 
advisors also had strong economic incentives to address the 
problem. Soon after Gorbachev became general secretary, he 
learned the staggering costs of alcoholism: “9.3 million drunks 
picked off the streets in 1984, 12 million drunks arrested, and 13 
thousand rapes attributable to alcohol, along with 29 thousand 
robberies… Economic losses attributable to alcohol totaled 50-60 
billion rubles.”85 While implementation of the plan turned out to be 
a disaster, Gorbachev firmly believed that gains in productivity 
would pay for itself. Writing in retrospect, the general secretary 
remarked that “special economic calculations took into account the 
losses to industry due to drunkenness. The plan was to reduce 
alcohol sales gradually (I emphasize – gradually), as it was replaced 
by other goods in circulation and sources of budget revenue,” 
highlighting his belief that less alcohol consumption would spur 
significant productivity gains.86 Thus, Gorbachev and his close 
advisors regarded even an ostensibly moral issue such as the anti-
alcohol campaign as an inefficient use of the nation’s human capital.  
Finally, Soviet leaders saw the high proportion of the budget 
dedicated to military spending as a resource drain, especially during 
a moment in which the economy desperately needed investments in 
industrials and consumer goods. Despite his high status as a ranking 
Politburo member, Gorbachev was unaware of the extent of military 
spending until he took over the helm in March 1985. Upon assuming 
command, he later wrote he was shocked to find that “military 
expenditure was not 16 per cent of the state budget, as we had been 
told, but rather 40 per cent; and its production was not 6 percent but 
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20 per cent of the gross national product.”87 Although not initially 
privy to the same level of data as the general secretary, Gorbachev’s 
principal advisors viscerally understood the need to reform military 
spending. Yakovlev scathingly commented in an essay written 
during this time that “[i]t is probably impossible to calculate how 
much was spent in fifty years on the militarization of the country.”88 
While different advisors debated just how fatal the military burden 
was, there was no doubt that both Gorbachev and his advisors 
viewed the sector as a tremendous drain on Soviet resources that 
necessitated reform.89  
 Gorbachev had long understood that the military drained 
Soviet resources, but access to full information upon ascension to 
general secretary shaped his fledgling foreign policy in truly radical 
ways. By the 27th Party Congress in early 1986, the Soviet leader 
had embraced the need for ‘new thinking.’ Though Gorbachev 
undoubtedly held a strong moral aversion to the use of force, ‘new 
thinking’ had a practical element as well. This party congress, 
according to Chernyaev, cemented Gorbachev’s idea that there was 
a “connection between every important domestic issue and foreign 
policy.”90 In May 1986, Gorbachev exhorted his diplomats to 
abandon the confrontational mindset that led to the arms race, 
proclaiming: “‘Soviet foreign policy… must alleviate the burden’ of 
military expenditures” and “do anything in its capabilities to loosen 
the vise of defense expenditures.”91 By ratcheting down the arms 
race, Gorbachev realized he could alleviate the pressure constricting 
the Soviet economy since the Cold War began. Gorbachev thus 
reimagined Soviet foreign policy, repurposing it with a new goal: 
“do everything… to weaken the grip of expenses on defense.”92 
With ‘new thinking’, Gorbachev slowly began to dismantle decades 
of Soviet foreign policy insecurity, open up to engagement with his 
superpower rival, and ultimately, thaw the Cold War. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Speaking at the Kremlin in a dinner for the American-Soviet 
Trade and Economic Council at the end of 1985, Gorbachev 
pointedly scolded American leaders for their history of ineffective 
sanctions. “You all know the results: The Soviet Union has not 
sustained much damage, but the commercial reputation of American 
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business and thus its competitive power have been seriously 
undermined on the Soviet market.”93 In 1955, 1965, or 1975, these 
words may have sounded like typical Soviet propaganda. Yet in the 
wake of the Siberian pipeline fiasco, these words likely rang true to 
the audience of American business executives. 
Though an influential group of hawkish American leaders 
sought to pressure the Soviet oil industry, these efforts failed to 
achieve their desired effect. The Reagan administration’s embargo 
on technology critical to energy industry broke down when Western 
European nations balked at joining sanctions. Instead of adding 
pressure on the USSR, these sanctions exposed small fractures in the 
democratic-capitalist alliance and temporarily weakened Western 
negotiating power. Reagan realized that Shultz and the moderate 
wing were correct. Unilateral sanctions ran counter to the American 
president’s negotiating objectives and Reagan opted not to pursue 
further economic pressure against the USSR for the rest of his 
presidency.  
By 1985, Gorbachev viscerally understood the need for 
reform after personally witnessing years of stagnating growth and 
declining productivity across the entire Soviet economy. The 
general secretary and his close advisers firmly believed the current 
socialist system impeded innovation and incentivized inefficiencies, 
putting the Soviets at a disadvantage to Western market-based 
systems. Stark problems in the energy industry did factor into this 
calculus. Throughout the 1980s, stagnating productivity and 
precipitous price declines weighed heavily on Soviet leaders’ minds. 
Although low oil prices affected the implementation and 
effectiveness of economic reforms, Gorbachev and his key advisors 
planned to reform before prices deteriorated in late 1985. And while 
stagnating energy productivity pressured the USSR’s hard currency 
profitability, Soviet leaders understood widespread inefficiencies in 
the context of the greater economy. Facing these fundamental 
issues, Gorbachev undertook a radical program of economic and 
political reform that unintentionally undermined the Soviet system. 
By the time the Berlin Wall fell in 1989, the Soviet economy 
was crumbling and the once-proud state was rapidly losing its power 
over democratically elected officials in Eastern Europe. This result 
ultimately allowed ‘Victory School’ historians to claim that 
Reagan’s policies had forced a weakened Soviet Union into 
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negotiations with a revitalized United States. Yet though the 
outcomes matched Reagan’s goals, these outcomes did not result 
from Reagan’s policies. Gorbachev’s willingness to engage the 
United States came not from effective economic pressure from its 
ideological counterpart, but rather from the fundamental 
understanding that domestic reform was inextricably linked to 
foreign policy reform. With a desperate desire to revitalize 
socialism, Gorbachev slowly abandoned the ideological bounds of 
his predecessors and engaged with an adversary open to change, 
thus beginning the process that ended the Cold War. 
 
 
Notes 
1 Antony J. Blinken, Ally vs. Ally: America Europe and the Siberian Pipeline 
Crisis (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 1987), pp. 3, 10. 
2 Peter Schweizer, Victory: The Reagan Administration’s Secret Strategy that 
Hastentened the Collapse of the Soviet Union (New York: Atlantic Monthly 
Press, 1994), p. xix. 
3 Francis Marlo, Planning Reagan’s War: Conservative Strategists and 
America’s Cold War Victory (Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, 2012), p. 18. 
4 David Painter. “Oil and the End of the Cold War.” Conference: Ronald Reagan 
and the Transformation of Global Politics in the 1980s. Austin, TX, January 
2017, p. 30. 
5 Tyler Esno, “Reagan’s Economic War on the Soviet Union,” Diplomatic 
History  42 (April 2018), p. 303. 
6 CIA Crest, “Prospects for Soviet Oil Production,” April 1977, p 9, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-
rdp08s01350r000602080002-0.; Thane Gustafson, Crisis Amid Plenty: The 
Politics of Soviet Energy Under Brezhnev and Gorbachev (Princeton, N.J.: 
Princeton University Press, 1989), pp. 28-29.; Bruce Jentleson, Pipeline 
Politics: The Complex Political Economy of East-West Energy Trade (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1986), pp. 151-52. 
7 Vagit Alekperov, Oil of Russia: Past, Present & Future (Minnetonka: East 
View Press, 2011), p. 312. 
8 Robert Allen. “The Rise and Decline of the Soviet Economy,” Revue 
Canadienne d'Economique 34, No. 4. (November 2001), p. 877. 
9 CIA Crest, “Prospects for Soviet Oil Production,” p. 3. 
10 Gustafson, Crisis Amid Plenty, 67. 
11 Central Statistical Administration of the USSR. National Economy of the 
USSR (Narkhoz). in Allen Smith, Russia and the World Economy (New York: 
Routledge, 1993), p. 81. 
12 Yegor Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire: Lessons for Modern Russia 
(Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2007), p. 110. 
 
19
von Kannewurff: Undermining 'The Deal of the Century'
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
 81 
 
13 CIA Crest, “The State of the Soviet Economy and the Role of East-West 
Trade,” October 1981, p. 18, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-
rdp88b00443r001103890007-6. 
14 Smith, Russia and the World Economy, 56. 
15 Gustafson, Crisis Amid Plenty. pp. 268-269. 
16 CIA Crest, “The State of the Soviet Economy and the Role of East-West 
Trade,” p. 9. 
17 Philip Hanson, The Rise and Fall of the Soviet Economy: An Economic 
History of the USSR From 1945 (London: Longman, 2003) p. 156. 
18 Gaidar, Collapse of an Empire, 105. 
19 Gustafson, Crisis Amid Plenty, 285. 
20 CIA Crest, “The State of the Soviet Economy and the Role of East-West 
Trade,” p. 10.; CIA Crest, “Oil and Gas Market: Outlook Through the Mid-
1980s,” November 1982, p. 1, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-
rdp83b00851r000400010005-7. 
21 CIA Crest, “The State of the Soviet Economy and the Role of East-West 
Trade,” p. 20. 
22 “Dependence of Soviet Military Power on Economic Relations with the 
West,” Special National Intelligence Estimate, November 17, 1981, pp. 351 -  
353 in Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States, Soviet 
Union, January 1981- January 1983, volume 3, document 102, 
https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v03. 
23 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 172.; Blinken, Ally vs. Ally, 31. 
24 CIA Crest, “Outlook for the Siberia-to-Western Europe Natural Gas Pipeline,” 
August 1982, pp. 4-5, https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-
rdp84b00049r001202890013-1.; “The Soviet Gas Pipeline in Perspective,” 
Special National Intelligence Estimate, September 21, 1982, pp. 704 – 708, 
FRUS, January 1981-1983, 3: 213. 
25 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 172. 
26 Blinken, Ally vs. Ally, 95.; Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 183 -185. 
27 CIA Crest, “DCI Remarks to the President’s Economic Policy Advisory 
Board,” 18 March 1982, p. 1, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/cia-
rdp84b00049r001202890013-1.; Special National Intelligence Estimate, 
November 17, 1981, pp. 351 -  353, FRUS, January 1981- January 1983, 3: 
102.  
28 Memorandum, by Casey, October 29, 1981, FRUS, January 1981 – January 
1983, 3: 98. 
29 Memorandum, by Clark, January 27, 1982, FRUS, January 1981 – January 
1983, 3: 139. 
30 Esno, “Reagan’s Economic War on the Soviet Union,” 295. 
31 Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, July 6, 1981, FRUS, January 
1981 – January 1983, 3: 68. 
32 Memorandum, by Haig, July 8, 1981, Ibid., 70. 
20
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 9 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/6
 82 
 
33 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York City: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 
pp. 237-238. 
34 Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, July 6, 1981, FRUS, January 
1981 – January 1983, 3: 68. 
35 Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, September 22, 1981, Ibid., 
214. 
36 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 21, 195.; CIA Crest, “USSR-Western Europe: 
Implications of the Siberia-to-Europe Gas Pipeline,” 1 February 1981, pp. 2-3, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/document/0000500594. 
37 Letter, by Pipes, May 22, 1981, FRUS, January 1981 – January 1983, 3: 172. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ronald Reagan, “NSDD 41,” 22 June, 1982, 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html. 
40 Minutes of a Senior Interdepartmental Group for International Economic 
Policy, September 16, 1981, FRUS, January 1981 – January 1983, 3: 212. 
41 Painter, “Oil and the End of the Cold War,” 15. 
42 George Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: Diplomacy, Power and the Victory of 
the American Deal (New York: Scribner, 1993), p. 140.; Esno, “Reagan’s 
Economic War on the Soviet Union,” 301. 
43 Ronald Reagan, “NSDD 66,” 29 November, 1982, 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html.; Alan P. Dobson, “The Reagan 
Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the Cold War,” 
Diplomatic History 29 (June 2005), 548. 
44 Minutes of a National Security Council Meeting, November 9, 1982, FRUS, 
January 1981 – January 1983, 3: 232.; Robert C. McFarlane, Special Trust, 
(London: Cadell & Davies, 1994), p. 221.; Painter, “Oil and the End of the Cold 
War,” 15-16.; Blinken, Ally vs. Ally, 119-120; Alan P. Dobson, “The Reagan 
Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the Cold War,” 
548. 
45 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 211-214.; Esno “Reagan’s Economic War on the 
Soviet Union,” 301.; Dobson, “The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, 
and Starting to Close Down the Cold War,” 547 – 548. 
46  Ronald Reagan, “Radio Address to the Nation on East-West Trade Relations 
and the Soviet Pipeline Sanctions,” University of Michigan Digital Library: The 
Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Reagan, 1982, vol. II, pp. 
1464–1465, https://quod.lib.umich.edu/p/ppotpus/4732272.1982.002?view=toc. 
47 Marlo, Planning Reagan’s War, 30. 
48 Schweizer, Victory, 132. 
49 Ronald Reagan, “NSDD 75,” 17 January 1983, 
https://fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html.; James 
50 Ronald Reagan, “NSDD 75,” 17 January 1983.; James Mann, The Rebellion 
of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War (New York: Viking 
Press, 2009), p. 249. 
51 Memorandum, by Shultz, March 16, 1983, 
http://www.thereaganfiles.com/19830316-shultz.pdf. 
52 Ibid. 
21
von Kannewurff: Undermining 'The Deal of the Century'
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
 83 
 
53 Reagan, An American Life, 572. 
54 Shultz, Turmoil & Triumph, 279. 
55 Ibid., 281. 
56 Esno “Reagan’s Economic War on the Soviet Union,” 301-02; Dobson, “The 
Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to Close Down the 
Cold War,” 553. 
57 Reagan, American Life, 584. 
58 Dobson, “The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, and Starting to 
Close Down the Cold War,” 552. 
59 Blinken, Ally vs. Ally, 122. 
60 Melvyn Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet 
Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), p. 361. 
61 Mann, The Rebellion of Reagan, 248. 
62 Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph, 144. 
63 Jentleson, Pipeline Politics, 211-214.; Esno “Reagan’s Economic War on the 
Soviet Union,” 301.; Dobson, “The Reagan Administration, Economic Warfare, 
and Starting to Close Down the Cold War,” 547 – 548. 
64 Painter, “Oil and the End of the Cold War,” 10.; Esno, “Reagan’s Economic 
War on the Soviet Union,” 293. 
65 Schweizer, Victory, 202-205, 242-245, 255-56. 
66 Painter, “Oil and the End of the Cold War,” 27-29. 
67 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996). pp. 93-94.; 
William Taubman, Gorbachev: His Life and Times (New York: W. W. Norton 
& Company, 2017), p. 127. 
68 Archie Brown, The Gorbachev Factor (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1997), p. 45.; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 371. 
69 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 46. 
70 Brown, The Gorbachev Factor, 43. 
71 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 102-103.; Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 369. 
72 Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich, The Destruction of the Soviet 
Economic System: An Insiders' History (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 95. 
73 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 147. 
74 Alexander Yakovlev. The Fate of Marxism in Russia. (New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 1993), p. 77. 
75 Anatoly Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev (State College: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), pp. 27-28. 
76 Ibid. 
77 Alekperov, Oil of Russia, 314. 
78 Gustafson, Crisis Amid Plenty, 50. 
79 Painter, “Oil and the End of the Cold War,” 18-22. 
80 Gustafson, Crisis Amid Plenty, 50. 
81 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 178. 
82 Ibid. 
83 Gustafson, Crisis Amid Plenty, 50-51. 
84 Mikhail Gorbachev, Perestroika, (New York: Harper and Row, 1987), p. 30. 
85 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 220. 
22
James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 9 [2019], Iss. 2, Art. 6
https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol9/iss2/6
 84 
 
86 Taubman, Gorbachev, 232. 
87 Gorbachev, Memoirs, 215. 
88 Yakovlev, The Fate of Marxism in Russia, p. 76. 
89 Ellman & Kontorvich, The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System, 14-16. 
90 Chernyaev, My Six Years with Gorbachev, 55. 
91 Vladislav Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from 
Stalin to Gorbachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2009), p. 
289. 
92 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 376. 
93 Robert Maxwell, Gorbachov: Speeches and Writings (New York: Pergamon 
Press, 1986), p. 316. 
23
von Kannewurff: Undermining 'The Deal of the Century'
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2019
